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Information Exchange in Policy Networks
Philip Leifeld Volker Schneider
Abstract
Information exchange in policy networks is usually attributed to preference similar-
ity, influence reputation, social trust and institutional actor roles. We suggest that
political opportunity structures and transaction costs play another crucial role and
estimate a rich statistical network model on tie formation in the German toxic che-
micals policy domain. The results indicate that the effect of preference similarity
is absorbed by institutional, relational and social opportunity structures. Political
actors choose contacts that minimize transaction costs while maximizing outreach
and information. We also find that different types of information exchange operate
in complementary, but not necessarily congruent, ways.
Keywords: Policy Networks, ERGM, Information Exchange, Transaction Cost
Theory, Interest Groups
The policy network approach assumes that policy-making is affected by a variety of or-
ganized governmental and non-governmental actors (Adam and Kriesi 2007), who main-
tain relations like information or resource exchange, influence attribution, or common
group membership. Policy networks are usually supported by “polycentric” institutional
arrangements (Ostrom 2010) facilitating collaboration and information exchange in a
long-term pespective as a kind of “2nd order economization” (Williamson 2000).
The question how policy networks operate has provoked a substantial number of pol-
icy network studies over the course of the last 30 years. Some of the more recent analyses
have tried to assess the reasons why political actors establish contacts to some actors
but not to others. Particularly ideology (Henry, Lubell, and McCoy 2011; Laumann,
Tam, Heinz et al. 1992), preference similarity on political issues (Carpenter, Esterling,
and Lazer 2004; Henry, Lubell, and McCoy 2011; Ko¨nig and Bra¨uninger 1998; Weible
and Sabatier 2005; Zafonte and Sabatier 1998), preference dissimilarity (Stokman and
Zeggelink 1996; Stokman and Berveling 1998), functional or institutional interdepen-
dence (Ko¨nig and Bra¨uninger 1998; Zafonte and Sabatier 1998), social trust (Carpenter,
Esterling, and Lazer 2004; Henry, Lubell, and McCoy 2011; Berardo and Scholz 2010) and
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perceived influence (Stokman and Zeggelink 1996; Stokman and Berveling 1998; Weible
and Sabatier 2005) have been found to be drivers of tie formation in policy networks.
In contrast to some of the above-mentioned studies, we argue that preference similarity
does not predict tie formation in policy networks sufficiently well. Instead, we posit
that institutional, relational and social opportunity structures exert a strong influence
on the communication between actors. Establishing contacts is apparently not trivial,
so actors have to rely on institutionalized venues like policy-related committees, and
make use of already existing channels of communication, among other strategies that
minimize informational costs and maximize the credibility of the information they obtain.
We subsume the arguments of preference similarity and opportunity structures under a
broader theory of “transaction cost politics” (North 1990) applied to policy networks.
Moreover, tie formation is qualified by the type of information exchange under
scrutiny. This point has been neglected by other studies conducted so far. Scientific or
technical information exchange, on the one hand, and political or strategic information
exchange, on the other hand, may serve quite different purposes. This qualification can
also explain why some empirical studies find a positive correlation between preference
similarity and tie probability, while others suggest a negative association.
We examine these points by analyzing political and technical information exchange in
the policy domain of toxic chemicals regulation in Germany in the 1980s. Previous work
on this policy network by the authors (Schneider 1988; Schneider and Leifeld 2009) has
revealed that actors who occupy central positions in the information exchange network
also maintain policy positions closer to the final policy outcome. In the light of this policy-
relevant finding, it is interesting to know what drives centrality in the communication
network, or more broadly, what determines whether two organizations actually exchange
information or not. The primary goal is to find a model that explains policy network
formation sufficiently well. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that all
of the presumably relevant hypotheses are included in a single model and that dyadic
dependence is explicitly taken into account.
Our paper is structured as follows: first, we set out our argument about opportunity
structures and transaction costs and derive testable hypotheses. The next section intro-
duces the policy domain under scrutiny, the data collection process, our variables, and
the methodology of exponential random graph models that we employ. We will present
the results of our analysis and discuss the model fit. A conclusion puts the results into
perspective and suggests further theoretical and empirical pathways.
Opportunity structures and transaction costs
Contact-making in policy networks is beneficial for several reasons. It serves to gather
information, disseminate information (and thus exert influence), and team up with al-
lies against political opponents. Yet, at the same time, actors cannot simply maintain
information exchange relations with all other actors who are presumably relevant. Es-
tablishing contacts is expensive in terms of labor, time and money. Resources spent on
contact-making cannot be spent on other activities which may have a higher priority.
Agents weigh the costs and benefits of establishing a contact. This observation is in line
with more general models of network formation (Bala and Goyal 2000).
Political actors try to reduce transaction costs by making use of “opportunity struc-
tures”. The notion of opportunity structures emerged between 1930 and 1960 as a soci-
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ological concept (Merton 1995) emphasizing “differential access to opportunities”. Later
it diffused to social movement research (Kitschelt 1986) and institutional analysis (Knill
2001) in political science. As early as in 1973, Laumann and Pappi (1973) used the idea
of opportunity structures in a twofold perspective differentiating between an institutional
and a relational view. In such a perspective, we conceive of opportunity structures as
pre-existing or institutionalized venues where actors can communicate without incurring
significant costs.
In a “transaction cost politics” perspective (North 1990), institutionalized forms of
exchange and collaboration can be more efficient due to lower transaction costs in the
long run (Williamson 1991). This view is also supported by associational theories of
interest intermediation, such as neo-corporatism, where institutionalized participation in
policy-making via specialized committees and forums is regarded as a distinct form of
governance beside communities, states and markets (Streeck and Schmitter 1985). Along
these lines, Schneider, Scholz, Lubell et al. (2003) view networks as public goods be-
cause institutionalized relations help to promote cooperative solutions to policy problems
precisely by overcoming transaction costs.
Policy committees as institutionalized venues
In policy committees at the national and supranational level, relevant governmental and
non-governmental actors participate in collective policy deliberation, decision-making and
implementation. Recently, such arrangements have also been discussed as “collaborative
institutions” (Lubell, Henry, and McCoy 2010) or “collaborative governance” (Ansell and
Gash 2008). They are important institutional opportunity structures for communication
in policy making. Our institutional opportunity structure hypothesis implies that policy
makers and interest groups try to use institutionalized access to policy-making committees
to acquire “cheap” contacts in the pursuit of minimizing costs while maximizing outreach
and information. Being connected anyway by shared membership in policy committees
means that communication is facilitated by low transaction costs. Actors literally go
the path of least resistance in order to keep transaction costs at a low level: the more
institutionalized venues there are, the more likely is a communication tie (as conjectured
but not explicitly tested by Ko¨nig and Bra¨uninger 1998: 448), all else being equal. We
therefore devise the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Policy committees
The more common policy committees two actors take part in, the more likely
they are to exchange information.
Existing social relations
Transaction costs may also be reduced by informal relational opportunity structures.
They are not necessarily institutionalized. A second test of the opportunity structure
hypothesis can be achieved when considering the different types of information that exist
and that can be exchanged by actors.
As will be demonstrated below, two complementary logics of information exchange
are at work, which rest on two different types of communication between agents: polit-
ical/strategic and technical/scientific information exchange. Both types of information
are on a continuum, but we assume that it is possible to distinguish between them by
employing standardized questions, albeit with some “noise”.
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Actors use already existing channels to reduce transaction costs. If actor A sends
scientific information to actor B anyhow, there are virtually no costs associated with
sending further information, such as strategic advice, and vice-versa.
Hypothesis 2 a: Other communication channels
If an actor sends political/strategic information to another actor, it is more
likely also to send technical/scientific information to the other actor, and vice
versa.
Similarly, an ego that obtains information from an alter can be expected to reciprocate
this information exchange tie because the channel exists anyway and does not cause any
new costs. Reciprocity of edges is also a relational opportunity structure.
Hypothesis 2 b: Reciprocity
If an actor receives information from another actor, it is more likely also to
send information to this actor.
Influence of third parties on information exchange
Institutional opportunity structures and pre-existing relational information channels are
only two obvious ways to avoid transaction costs. A strongly related social opportunity
structure is the existence of third parties and hence social trust.
In interpersonal networks, approaching strangers is more costly than approaching
friends of friends. Common acquaintances help to reduce the uncertainty about the qual-
ity of the alter. Interorganizational relations work in a similar way. Actors need common
“friends” to reduce uncertainty about the quality of their contact (cf. Berardo and Scholz
2010). Coordinating with another organization is more promising the more shared part-
ners exist. The number of allies who trust an organization is a good indicator of its quality,
both in terms of its information (for an information-centric perspective, see Carpenter,
Esterling, and Lazer 2004) and in terms of being a powerful ally. Common neighborhood
clearly matters. As a consequence, actors are more likely to trust information from an-
other organization if it is in the same coalition. At the meso-level, this mechanism results
in self-reinforcing coalitions (Henry, Lubell, and McCoy 2011; Sabatier and Weible 2007).
The number of shared partners is also related to the concept of “bonding” structures as
transitive triads increase ego’s trust in alter (Berardo and Scholz 2010).1
But the argument expands beyond quality. Relying on one’s contacts to establish new
ties lowers the costs of searching for new contacts and deciding whether they are worth
the effort. Trusting others is more efficient. We therefore include a transitivity-related
term in our model which checks whether directed two-paths between two actors positively
affect their likelihood of establishing a direct tie.
Hypothesis 3: Third parties
The more shared partners two actors have, the more likely they are to establish
an information exchange link.
1See the supporting information for more details about transitivity versus shared partners.
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Perceived influence and formal decision-making power
In a transaction cost perspective, perceived influence of a potential alter is a sign of high
quality, either in terms of its information potential or as a powerful ally. Opting for such
contacts increases the benefits of information exchange. Perceived influence serves as a
search heuristic. Connecting to presumably influential agents is the best bet if the quality
of an alter is otherwise unknown.
Weible and Sabatier (2005) find a moderate effect of influence attribution on policy
coordination and advice-seeking even when holding preference similarity constant. Their
study on California Marine Protected Area Policy reveals that “in technical, complex
policy subsystems with influential organizational affiliations that control resources, actors
have to get some advice/information and coordinate somewhat with influential affiliations
– irrespective of beliefs” (Weible and Sabatier 2005: 471). This interpretation follows
resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), which states that organizations
have to establish contacts to well-resourced organizations to maintain their survival in a
world of scarce resources. Actors seek alliances with those who are in control of formal
decision-making power or informal, but extensive, access to relevant decision makers.
Hojnacki (1997) provides evidence for the effect of perceived influence on alliance-seeking:
“when organizations perceived to be ‘pivotal’ to success are members of an alliance [. . . ],
the benefits of coalition appear substantial” (Hojnacki 1997: 61). We test for the effect
of influence attribution by including the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 a: Perceived influence
The greater an actor perceives the influence of another actor, the more likely
the actor is to establish an information exchange tie to this potential contact.
Evidently, this hypothesis bears the danger of misspecifying the direction of causality.
Does ego choose alter because it perceives alter to be influential? Or does ego rate
alter as being influential because overemphasizing the influence of one’s contacts boosts
one’s own reputation? In order to avoid this potential pitfall, we additionally model the
institutional influence rather than perceived influence as a driving factor of information
exchange. The assumption underlying the following hypothesis is that governmental
actors – in the narrow sense, e. g., federal ministries and administrative agencies – are by
definition influential because they can exert formal decision-making power.
Hypothesis 4 b: Governmental access
Governmental actors have disproportionately many incoming information ex-
change ties.
Thereby, interest groups are likely to submit scientific information to the government
in order to increase the chance that their views and opinions are codified into law. This
argument is resonated by the literature on lobbying. In the model of Austen-Smith and
Wright (1992) and in many theories of interest intermediation (for an overview, see van
Waarden 1992), interest groups send information to governmental actors. The litera-
ture on policy network formation largely supports the governmental access hypothesis
(Carpenter, Esterling, and Lazer 2004; Ko¨nig and Bra¨uninger 1998).
In addition to this lobbying perspective, decision-makers actively acquire technical
knowledge from scientific actors and think tanks in order to increase the quality of their
decisions or simply to obtain justification of their decisions (Sabatier 1987: 650).
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Interest group homophily
In order to maximize the benefits of communication, interest groups are especially likely
to connect to other interest groups. We can expect this pattern for two reasons.
First, information exchange serves to coordinate activities in pursuit of a common
goal. Such a goal is nowhere else as pronounced as in lobbying groups because their very
motivation is to change (or retain) the status quo. In other words, interest groups are more
likely than other actors to seek alliances because their payoff from cooperating with others
is higher. At the same time, interest groups are particularly attractive allies because their
intrinsic motivation to attain policy goals is higher than the intrinsic motivation of other
actors like, for example, scientific organizations.
Second, interest groups seek to convince their opponents, so they send them technical
information about the appropriate policy design. Quite obviously, other interest groups
are – if decision-makers are controlled for – the primary target of belief manipulation via
technical information because they are at the core of the adversarial coalition (Sabatier
and Weible 2007). The two mechanisms result in mutual attachment between interest
groups (in network terms “homophily”, cf. McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001).
Hypothesis 5: Interest group homophily
Interest groups are particularly likely to exchange information with other in-
terest groups.
Two complementary logics of information exchange
Most of the literature on policy network formation stresses that preference similarity is
key to understanding information exchange patterns. We therefore examine the effect
of preference similarity and use it as a baseline for our model. Moreover, there are two
apparently contradictory mechanisms of preference similarity. They can be resolved by
taking into account the type of information that is exchanged. We subsume preference
similarity under the cost-benefit model of policy network formation presented above.
The majority of studies finds that information exchange is driven by similar prefer-
ences (Carpenter, Esterling, and Lazer 2004; Henry, Lubell, and McCoy 2011; Huckfeldt
and Sprague 1987; Ko¨nig and Bra¨uninger 1998; Sabatier and Weible 2007; Weible and
Sabatier 2005; Zafonte and Sabatier 1998). Few others suggest that actors seek to estab-
lish links to agents with dissimilar preferences (cf. Kollman 1997). This view is reflected
in the policy maximization model of Stokman and Zeggelink (1996) and Stokman and
Berveling (1998) and the competitive lobbying model of Austen-Smith and Wright (1992).
A third theoretical possibility is that actors initially have no opinion and are convinced
by other actors. How can these seemingly contrary hypotheses be reconciled?
Political actors weigh the costs and benefits of establishing a tie. In the first perspec-
tive, coordination with like-minded actors is advantageous because coalitions are more
powerful in the political process than individual agents. This is in line with the predic-
tion of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier and Weible 2007) that coordination
takes place inside coalitions, but not between them. Here, the contents of institutional
communication is political or strategic information. Shared strategies can be conceived of
as a power resource (Ko¨nig and Bra¨uninger 1998). Contact-making is beneficial because
coalition-building is instrumental for becoming a policy winner (Baumgartner and Jones
1991). Obviously, contacts with a similar ideology have the highest utility, which renders
preference similarity a special case of the theory outlined above.
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In the second perspective, actors try to “convince” adversarial organizations of the
optimal policy design and thus their own ideal points by establishing “access relations”.
The type of information being transmitted here is rather technical or scientific and in-
cludes details about how the policy at issue could be designed. It contains knowledge
about the causes and consequences of a complex problem, policy goal priorities, and tech-
nical policy advice, often generated by scientific organizations in the first place and sent
to interest groups or governmental actors. Both types of information are on a continuum,
but we assume that it is possible to distinguish between them by employing standardized
questions, albeit with some “noise”. In order to take into account these two logics of
information exchange, we estimate two separate models.
Yet, access relations are only possible because the supply of technical information is
met by a corresponding demand of such information at the opposite side of a mutual ex-
change relation. This touches upon the third theoretical option presented above. There
is a need for reliable and timely information. Technical information is an important
resource in the struggle against complexity and uncertainty (Heclo 1978). Actors will
turn to other agents whom they deem well-informed, and these agents are not necessar-
ily opponents. Therefore, we expect the effect of preference similarity to be much less
pronounced in the technical/scientific information exchange network.
If the above propositions hold true, we should expect actors in the latter network to
draw their information primarily from scientific organizations because they are techni-
cally knowledgeable, and policy analyses originating from science are often used to justify
one’s own policy beliefs (Sabatier 1987). We include a control variable for scientific orga-
nizations as information senders. According to our distinction, scientific actors maintain
many outgoing information ties in the scientific information exchange network. This
should not be the case when it comes to political and strategic information.
Data collection and methodology
The previous sections have set out a theory of information exchange between policy actors
which incorporates opportunity structures and preference similarity as two concurrent
drivers of policy network formation. We have compiled a list of testable hypotheses
which are implied by the theory. They shall be tested with a dataset on toxic chemicals
regulation in Germany in the 1980s collected by one of the authors (Schneider 1988).
This section will introduce the case of toxic chemicals policy-making and describe the
data collection process.
The toxic chemicals problem
After World War II, the production of chemicals increased to an unprecedented level.
Approximately 100,000 different chemical substances were traded on the global market.
Many of these chemicals were evidently extremely dangerous for human health and the
environment, sometimes in the form of insidious diseases or after long-term contact. At
the beginning of the 1970s, most industrialized countries adopted the view that a passive
treatment of these toxic substances was no longer affordable. They initiated chemicals
control programs and testing procedures for chemical substances.
In Germany, a legislative process was started mainly upon the initiative of the OECD
and the European Community at the end of the 1970s. The effort culminated in the
adoption of a law for the protection against dangerous substances (ChemG) in 1980.
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However, this law was restricted to the control of newly produced chemicals without
considering toxic substances already on the market. This restriction was intended by
the chemical industry because it feared fatal economic consequences if control obligations
were extended to existing chemicals. The chemical industry association (VCI) took a lead
position in this process because it possessed the representational monopoly of economic
and industrial interests in this policy domain, and these were in turn major employers
and investors on the global market. The chemical industry was not only a growth sector;
to a certain degree, it also promised a future-proof development due to its structural
closeness to genetic research, biotechnology and related industrial branches.
Selection of actors
As the main point of reference of this system of policy actors was the chemicals problem
and its direct and indirect effects, it was possible to define a set of interested actors. As far
as direct influences in the life cycle of a chemical are concerned, occupational safety, health
and environmental interests were potentially affected by the toxicity of the substances.
Moreover, a set of governmental actors was bound to react to the politicization of the
problem by these societal actors. It is therefore quite easy to derive the following set
of actors on theoretical and institutional grounds: the state, parties/the parliament,
organized interests (capital, labor, environment and consumers) and finally actors from
science and technology.
Methods from elite research were applied to conduct a proper specification of the
boundaries of the network (cf. Laumann, Marsden, and Prensky 1983). This task was
not negligible because the results of a network analysis critically depend on the valid and
reliable selection of actors. The positional approach served to compile a list of all possible
organizations from institutional sectors that were potentially affected by the problem of
toxic chemicals. The names of these organizations were collected from relevant hand-
books about public organizations and the list of lobbyists in the German parliament. At
the second stage of the selection procedure, press archives, lists of participants of relevant
events, and protocols and documents of relevant agencies and ministries were surveyed
to confirm or discard the actual participation of organizations, and some new actors were
added. This second stage is called the decision approach. The resulting list contained 90
organizations that were asked to submit annual reports, position papers, press releases
and other relevant documents. On the basis of these documents and a number of expert
interviews, 39 organizations were selected and asked to fill out a standardized question-
naire in the winter of 1984/1985, following the approach of Laumann and Knoke (1987)
and Laumann and Pappi (1973). Eight more actors were named by the interviewees. The
response rate was 85 % (40 out of the 47 actors). To obtain a complete influence core
from this actor set, only those 30 actors were retained who were cited as being influential
by at least one of the other actors. This final list of actors is composed of eleven govern-
mental actors (among them six federal ministries), three parties, seven organized interest
groups, six scientific/research organizations, and three international organizations. Fur-
ther details about the actors and the data collection process are provided by Schneider
(1988).
The set of 30 actors is somewhat smaller than the datasets used in some of the other
articles. However, the careful data collection procedure ensures a high quality of the data
in terms of reliability and validity. Since the two networks to be modeled are directed
and we concentrate on edges as the unit of analysis, there are n2 − n = 870 observations
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which are partly dependent on each other, so the real number of observations might be
smaller than 870.
Measurement and variables
The two network relations of interest are political/strategic and scientific/technical in-
formation exchange. The political/strategic information exchange network was collected
by setting the following task:2
“Please list the names of all organizations with which you regularly exchange
information about affairs related to chemicals control.”
This network does not contain information about who sends information to whom, but it
is still directed because actors indicate whom they perceive to be information exchange
partners. The technical/scientific information exchange network was collected by asking
respondents the following questions:
“In the decision process on the chemicals law, scientific and technical infor-
mation was of central importance.
a) From which of the organizations mentioned on the list does your organi-
zation usually obtain scientific and technical information?
b) To which of the organizations does your organization deliver such infor-
mation?”
These two separate pieces of information about sending and receiving technical/scientific
information were combined in a single network matrix T by multiplying the entries of
the sender matrix S with the entries of the transpose of the receiver matrix R (i. e., the
Hadamard product). In other words, only when both sender and receiver indicated a
common tie, was it coded as 1, otherwise as 0. The result is a confirmed network:
T := SRT (1)
Preference similarity was measured by identifying six core policy topics relevant in
the decision process: self-regulation, the scope of the reform, the control procedure, the
timing of the control mechanism, intensity of control, and the treatment of chemicals
already being traded on the market (for more details, see the original study). For all
actors, agreement or disagreement with each issue was coded either as +1 (agreement), 0
(neutrality), or −1 (disagreement). The resulting variables i . . . n were used to construct
a dissimilarity matrix by calculating the Euclidean distance d between each pair of actors
p and q:
d(p, q) =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
(pi − qi)2 (2)
The dissimilarity matrix was converted into a similarity matrix by subtracting each
dissimilarity value from the maximum dissimilarity value:
s(p, q) = max(d)− d(p, q) (3)
2The original questionnaire was in German. The questions have been translated for this article.
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The resulting matrix of preference similarities between actors can be interpreted as
an undirected, weighted network, which can be subsequently used as an edge covariate
in a statistical network model.
Perceived influence was collected as a binary, directed network matrix with the row
actor indicating what column actors it perceived as influential.
Membership in policy committees was collected from the various documents surveyed
during the selection process and recorded as binary attribute variables in a data matrix
M. A square co-occurrence matrix C was generated, indicating which pairs of actors
attended how many committees together:
C := M ·MT (4)
Methodology and model specification
The purpose of this article is twofold: on the one hand, a statistical network model will
be employed to test the hypotheses set out above. On the other hand, the goal is to
model the information exchange behavior of political actors as adequately as possible, so
we are eventually able to reproduce the tie formation process using simulations.
As mentioned earlier on, networks show complex dependencies between ties, resulting
in matrix autocorrelation. In other words, the error terms in a simple OLS regression
would be correlated across observations, standard errors would be too small, and p val-
ues too optimistic. We therefore model the dependencies directly as a social network
and draw on the family of exponential random graph models (ERGM), or p* models,
described by Robins, Pattison, Kalish et al. (2007) and Robins, Snijders, Wang et al.
(2007) and implemented in the statnet package (Handcock, Hunter, Butts et al. 2003)
for the statistical computing environment R (R Development Core Team 2009). ERGMs
are an attempt at modeling the tie structure of a whole network in bottom-up fashion by
describing the network in terms of endogenous structural properties like cycles, clustering
or density, and covariates, which can take the form of nodal attributes (e. g., actor type)
and edge covariates (i. e., other relations).
The general form of exponential random graphs can be written as
Pr(Y = y) =
(
1
κ
)
exp {
∑
A
ηAgA(y)} (5)
with y representing a tie in the network Y, κ being a normalizing constant to ensure that
the probability scales to 1, gA(y) representing the model terms listed in table 1 (A is the
index of the model terms), and ηA being the coefficients of the model terms. Examples for
possible g statistics include the number of edges in the network, the number of edges from
interest groups to other interest groups, the number of policy committees co-attended by
tied actors, or the number of shared partners of connected actors (cf. Goodreau, Kitts,
and Morris 2009). η reflects the empirical impact of a g statistic on the observed network
Y. In order to model our two information exchange networks Y1 and Y2, we estimate a
dyadic dependence model with the model terms listed in table 1.
The model is fitted via Markov Chain Monte Carlo Maximum Likelihood Estimation
(MCMC MLE). The estimated coefficients can be interpreted like in a logit regression
model. The dependent variable is the log odds of establishing a network tie. Coefficients
are interpreted as log-odds ratios conditional on the rest of the network.
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L(y) a term containing the number of edges in the graph,∑
i<j yij
C(y) an undirected, weighted edge covariate representing the
number of common committee memberships as defined
in equation 4
H1
O(y) a directed, binary edge covariate representing the other
communication type not represented by Y (scienti-
fic/technical or political/strategic communication)
H2 a
R(y) a statistic capturing the propensity of ties to be recip-
rocated
H2 b
v(y, θ1) GWESP, the geometrically weighted edge-wise shared
partner statistic with parameter θ1; see Hunter (2007)
for details; we use a rather low value of θ1 = 0.1 to avoid
model degeneracy
H3
w(y, θ2) GWDSP, the geometrically weighted dyad-wise shared
partner statistic with parameter θ2 = 0.1
H3
IA(y) a directed, binary edge covariate representing influence
attribution
H4a
IFgov(y) a statistic representing ties where the target is a govern-
mental actor
H4b
Uig(y) a nodal attribute mixing statistic representing ties where
both the source and the target are interest groups
H5
PS(y) an undirected, weighted edge covariate representing
preference similarity as calculated by equation 3
C1
OFsci(y) a statistic representing ties where the source is a scien-
tific actor
C2
Table 1: Model terms and their affiliated hypotheses or control variables
Results and discussion
Table 2 shows the estimation results for four models. The first two are models of polit-
ical/strategic information exchange, and the last two of technical/scientific information
exchange. The edge term L(y) is comparable to the constant in other statistical models.
The first and the third model are limited to estimating the effect of preference similarity
on information exchange.
In the case of political/strategic information, tie formation is indeed positively asso-
ciated with preference similarity, while there is no such association in the case of tech-
nical/scientific information. The former observation is in accordance with the policy
maximization model (Stokman and Zeggelink 1996) and the Advocacy Coalition Frame-
work (Sabatier and Weible 2007), which posit that strategic information is exchanged
primarily among allies. The fact that there is no significant effect in the second case
indicates that the association between preferences and technical information exchange
might be somewhat more complex. Technical information is not merely used to influence
the opponent; this effect seems to be neutralized by the demand for information from
trustworthy sources (cf. Heclo 1978; Carpenter, Esterling, and Lazer 2004).
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
L(y) Edges −0.87∗∗∗ −3.63∗∗∗ −2.50∗∗∗ −5.86∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.19) (0.30) (0.31)
PS(y) Preference similarity 0.18∗∗ 0.07 −0.02 −0.05
(0.06) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11)
IFgov(y) Governmental alter 0.53
∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07)
OFsci(y) Scientific ego 0.05 1.51
∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.10)
C(y) Common committees 0.31∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
O(y) Scientific communication 3.12∗∗∗
(0.38)
O(y) Political communication 2.75∗∗∗
(0.06)
Uig(y) Interest group homophily 1.18
∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗
(0.12) (0.32)
IA(y) Influence attribution 0.84∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07)
v(y, θ1) GWESP 1.26
∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04)
w(y, θ2) GWDSP −0.15∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
R(y) Reciprocity 0.82∗∗∗ 1.86∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.15)
AIC 1161.59 853.58 456.09 314.48
BIC 1171.13 906.03 465.62 366.93
Log Likelihood −578.80 −415.79 −226.04 −146.24
MCMC MLE. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, ·p < 0.1
Table 2: Exponential random graph model
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If we take any other variable into account, even the positive effect of model 1 disap-
pears. Preference similarity is absorbed by other factors, which are captured by models
2 and 4. Our argument is that actors use institutional, social and relational opportunity
structures to establish contacts without incurring significant transaction costs, rather
than merely looking for actors that provide a good match. A test of these claims is pos-
sible when preference similarity is held constant and the additional effect of opportunity
structures is estimated. All three kinds of opportunity structures, as captured by com-
mon membership in policy committees, C(y), other social relations, O(y), reciprocity,
R(y), and third-party influence, v(y, θ1), are strong predictors of tie formation with all
six coefficients being highly significant and positive (hypotheses 1, 2 a, 2 b and 3). Hold-
ing other factors constant, shared access to one additional common policy committee
increases the odds of establishing a tie by 36% in the political/strategic and 17% in the
technical/scientific information exchange network, with a mean number of 1.99 shared
committees per dyad.3
If two organizations exchange one type of information, they are also much more likely
to exchange the other kind of information because the transmission channels exist any-
way. The effect of existing communication channels is considerably larger than the other
coefficients, but a word of caution is in order when interpreting this result: the measure-
ment of political/strategic information exchange is rather crude, implying that the two
types of information exchange are presumably not as clearly separated as they could be,
and the two relations might actually contribute less to each other than suggested by the
coefficients. However, including existing communication channels does not confound the
model; omitting them does not significantly alter the other coefficients. Moreover, the
fact that scientific organizations, OFsci(y), are significant senders of technical/scientific
information but not political or strategic information indicates that two separate logics
of communication are indeed at work and can be meaningfully distinguished. In the tech-
nical communication network, scientific or technical organizations are almost four times
as likely to establish an outgoing tie as other organizations, all else being equal.
Like other communication types, reciprocity is a relational opportunity structure.
Political and strategic information flows from ego to alter are more than twice as likely
if such flows also exist from alter to ego, and ties are more than five times as likely if
reverse ties exist in the technical and scientific information exchange network.
Transitivity effects of third parties can be clearly demonstrated as well. The geomet-
rically weighted edge-wise shared partner distribution (GWESP) and the geometrically
weighted dyad-wise shared partner distribution (GWDSP) can be interpreted together
(Hunter 2007). The GWESP statistic essentially captures whether those actors who
are tied are more likely than pure chance to have multiple transitive shared partners.
GWDSP captures the propensity of any dyad (whether connected or unconnected) to
have multiple transitive shared partners, which is a baseline effect of shared partners in
the network. GWESP is interpreted on top of that once dyad-wise shared partners have
been controlled for. GWESP and GWDSP have a geometric character, i. e., the number
of shared partners per dyad is weighted by θ1 = θ2 = 0.1. This rather low parameter
value puts more emphasis on dyads with few shared partners: dyads with one shared
partner are not particularly likely to have a second shared partner, and so on. Increasing
the parameter value would slowly decrease the model fit and convergence.
3The supporting material provides further summary statistics and several alternative model specifi-
cations in addition to the source code for replication and the list of actors and committees.
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The GWESP statistic is positive and highly significant in both networks, indicating
that social trust effects are at work. Connected dyads are indeed likely to have ap-
proximately one or two transitive shared partners. GWDSP is significant and negative,
i. e., there are generally fewer unconnected dyads with shared partners than predicted by
chance. As Baumgartner and Leech (1996: 532) note in their critique of Austen-Smith
and Wright (1996), there is a “social nature” of lobbying. Actors rely on others in order to
reduce transaction costs when finding allies or sources of information (Carpenter, Ester-
ling, and Lazer 2004; Henry, Lubell, and McCoy 2011). The effect of social opportunity
structures is stronger in the case of political and strategic information exchange, presum-
ably because alliance-building requires more trust than establishing access relations to
decision-makers or adversarial coalitions.
In general, our findings corroborate and extend the conclusions drawn by Lubell,
Schneider, Scholz et al. (2002). Opportunity structures that help to overcome trans-
action costs boost the emergence of cooperative ties. In addition to institutional and
individual factors, social and relational structures play another critical role in promoting
coordination. While Lubell, Schneider, Scholz et al. (2002) provide evidence for oppor-
tunity structures at the local, individual level, our analysis suggests that policy-making
in national-level policy domains works in a similar way.
Beside using opportunity structures to decrease transaction costs, organizations also
maximize the benefits of communication by selecting alters by their perceived and factual
influence. Actors are 60% more likely to send technical or scientific information to actors
whom they perceive to be particularly influential compared to actors whom they do not
rate as particularly influential, even when controlling for the institutional role of the
target node. Influence attribution, IA(y), is even more important for alliance-building
(Weible and Sabatier 2005): the odds of establishing a tie are increased by 132%.
As is the case with some other variables, we cannot fully rule out that causality
may be bi-directional. Nonetheless, omitting any of these variables does not alter the
models significantly. Furthermore, we can provide additional evidence for the influence-
maximizing behavior of political actors. The positively significant coefficients of the
governmental alter effect, IFgov(y), demonstrate that agents opt for contacts with formal,
institutional power (Austen-Smith and Wright 1992; Ko¨nig and Bra¨uninger 1998).
ERGMs require careful model selection because the same effect can often be repro-
duced by different network statistics. In an alternative model specification, we have
examined whether actors choose others based on the betweenness centrality of the con-
tact. In short, betweenness centrality captures how many shortest paths an actor is
involved in, and is therefore a measure of information control (Freeman 1979). Indeed,
the model term is highly significant, which is an additional indicator that actors try to
maximize outreach to influential actors, but the additional term does not substantially
improve the model fit.
Finally, interest groups are especially likely to contact other interest groups. If both
actors of a dyad are interest groups, this roughly triples the odds of political or technical
information exchange. Although the result is roughly the same for both networks, the
mechanism is probably different: in the former case, other interest groups serve as allies,
while actors may additionally try to convince their opponents using technical information
in the latter model (cf. Sabatier and Weible 2007). In both cases, however, information
is a critical power resource that is shared among interest groups with similar preferences
(Ko¨nig and Bra¨uninger 1998).
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Figure 1: Goodness of fit of the political information exchange model (upper row) and
the technical information exchange network (lower row)
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Goodness-of-fit assessment
As stated at the outset of this article, our primary goal is to find an appropriate model of
information exchange. Obviously, this should entail assessing the goodness of fit of our
model by simulating new networks from our coefficients. Simulating 100 networks from
each of the two complete models shows that the simulated networks are indistinguishable
from the original networks by eyeballing them. To support this claim, figure 1 plots three
well-known network statistics of the original network (the thick black line) and the 100
simulated networks (the box plots): indegree, minimum geodesic distance, and edge-wise
shared partners (for details, see Hunter, Goodreau, and Handcock 2008).
The indegree distribution of the original political network takes a zig-zag curve which
can be hardly caught by a parametric model. However, the model is not terribly off
the mark. Only indegrees of five, which seem to be quite common in the network, are
strongly underrepresented by the model. Nevertheless, adding a network statistic for
indegrees of five would certainly mean overfitting the model because there is no guidance
in the literature why actors should have five incoming ties, even more so given the much
lower frequencies of its neighboring indegrees four and six. The indegree distribution of
the technical network exhibits similar variation, but the simulated distributions seem to
represent the original network quite well if we consider the overall picture. The other two
statistics, minimum geodesic distance and edge-wise shared partners, perform extremely
well, with the case of zero edge-wise shared partners being slightly overrepresented by
the second model.
Overall, the estimated models fit the data very well and seem to capture most of the
variation. All three simulated graph statistics predict the original networks with high
accuracy. This is a noteworthy finding because we seem to have incorporated all relevant
factors contributing to network formation. Such an undertaking is especially difficult
in policy-related applications because many layers of complexity are added by different
rationales of actors, institutional roles and constraints, voters, media discourses, etc.
Conclusion
First and foremost, our analysis has revealed the effect of opportunity structures on tie
formation in policy networks. Political organizations take transaction costs into account
when considering whom to approach. When actors choose potential interaction partners
because they are important in attaining policy-related goals, they also consider if these
potential exchange partners are easy to reach. Our finding suggests that politics is not
merely power-driven, but also resource-dependent. This bears some interesting policy
implications: if the state is interested in balancing organized interests in order not to be
captured, it may want to promote civil society groups that cannot afford to take part in
the inner circle of sectoral politics. Otherwise, one coalition might become more influ-
ential in the political process because its members are well connected, and this coalition
might bias political outcomes into their desired direction. This is precisely what hap-
pened in the case of German toxic chemicals regulation in the early 1980s (cf. Schneider
1988 for details). This normative approach is not new; it is well-known under the label
sponsored pluralism (cf. van Waarden 1992). However, subsidizing organized interests
selectively to keep up the balance may have negative welfare implications as well. Eco-
nomic scrutiny may show whether political gains of a balanced interest group population
outweigh efficiency losses due to the subsidies.
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Second, we have assembled a rather rich model of policy network formation. The
model fits the data very well, and we are confident that we have contributed to the
advancement of the literature on policy networks by providing a baseline model for po-
tential replications in other policy sectors or other contexts. After all, any policy network
study can only be a case study (cf. Baumgartner and Leech 1996: 531), and other policy
networks might operate quite differently due to other institutional contexts, so this is
certainly a worthwhile endeavor. Technological advances like the rise of electronic com-
munication may nowadays affect the way political organizations interact, rendering the
necessity of reducing transaction costs via policy committees meaningless.
Moreover, the kind of transaction cost politics outlined here may be a specific char-
acteristic of the German context and similar European political systems which follow
a corporatist and consensual tradition. In these regimes, non-majoritarian institutions,
such as institutionalized policy committees, are implemented in order to overcome trans-
action costs (Gehring and Kerler 2008; Majone 2001). These differences between political
systems presumably translate into divergent patterns of regulatory policy-making, which
would suggest that institutional opportunity structures are less central in the United
States or other majoritarian or “adversarial” systems (Jasanoff 2005; Schneider 1985;
Vogel 1987).
Toxic chemicals regulation is a rather technical and scientific policy sector. There is
universal dependence on others’ expertise in technical issue networks due to uncertainty –
“men collectively wondering what to do” (Heclo 1978). For this reason, regulatory agen-
cies maximize reputation and minimize risk by relying on external information (Moffitt
2010; Carpenter 2002), which may have led to a policy-making style that relies on policy
committees in the first place (cf. Jasanoff 2005). We expect that actors find other in-
stitutional, relational or social opportunity structures in their pursuit of minimizing the
costs of political and strategic information exchange in less technical policy domains.
Third and finally, we have suggested that there is not one single way how a pol-
icy network operates. On the contrary, the exchange of technical information differs
from strategic information in some respects. Previous studies on tie formation in policy
networks tended to ignore this possibility, and information exchange was treated as a
homogeneous phenomenon. Nonetheless, the main effects are consistent across the two
relations; only institutional roles and preference similarity show different patterns. Re-
viewing the relevant theoretical literature has, in spite of this, suggested that the two
types of relations partly differ in their rationales, but not in their consequences for tie
formation patterns. For instance, technical information is often exchanged with allies
because they try to establish a common frame of reference (a cooperative relation). At
the same time, technical information is also exchanged with opponents, but this time
in order to alter their views on optimal policy design (a conflictual relation). Thus the
overall effect of preference (dis)similarity cannot be discerned simply by measuring tech-
nical information exchange, and the effect cannot be separated from strategic information
exchange. We therefore propose that future policy network analyses should take these
strategic uses of information into account when collecting data on information exchange
between organizations.
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Summary statistics
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the variables and relations used in the analysis.
Term Description type N min max mean SD
Y1 Political infor-
mation exchange
binary,
directed
870 0 1 0.39 0.49
Y2 Technical infor-
mation exchange
binary,
directed,
confirmed
870 0 1 0.07 0.26
C(y) Shared
committees
valued,
undirected
870 0 13 1.99 2.42
IA(y) Influence
attribution
binary,
directed
870 0 1 0.32 0.47
PS(y) Preference
similarity
valued,
undirected
870 0 4.9 2.42 1.14
BCY1(y) Y1 betweenness nodal attribute 30 0 125.10 19.30 29.73
BCY2(y) Y2 betweenness nodal attribute 30 0 109.90 18.00 29.90
Type of
organization
nodal attribute,
categorical
30 11 gov, 7 ig, 3 io, 3 par, 6 sci
Table 1: Summary statistics
Alternative model specifications
Political information Technical information
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
L(y) Edges −3.78∗∗∗ −3.62∗∗∗ −4.32∗∗∗ −6.49∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.17) (0.29) (0.34)
PS(y) Preference similarity 0.10 0.12· −0.07 0.13
(0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.13)
IFgov(y) Governmental alter 0.58
∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10)
OFsci(y) Scientific ego 0.35
∗∗∗ 0.08 1.58∗∗∗ 1.48∗∗∗
1
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
(0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.12)
C(y) Common committees 0.33∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
O(y) Scientific communication 3.48∗∗∗ 2.97∗∗∗
(0.42) (0.07)
Uig(y) Interest group homophily 1.22
∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.12) (0.33) (0.28)
IA(y) Influence attribution 0.88∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10)
v(y, θ1) GWESP 1.33
∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
w(y, θ2) GWDSP −0.16∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ −0.34∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
R(y) Reciprocity 0.98∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 2.15∗∗∗ 1.72∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.15) (0.15)
BC(y) Betweenness Centrality 0.00∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
AIC 890.26 856.46 354.93 307.44
BIC 937.94 913.68 402.61 364.66
Log Likelihood −435.13 −416.23 −167.46 −141.72
MCMC MLE. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, ·p < 0.1
Table 2: Exponential random graph model
Alternative model specifications 5 and 8 show that omitting other communication chan-
nels (as a relational opportunity structure) largely leaves the predictions unaffected. Mod-
els 6 and 9 show how the betweenness centrality of alter, BC(y), influences the choice
of peers compared to models 2 and 4. The effect is significant but small and does not
improve the model fit to a large extent.
Four other models have been tested but are not reported in table 2. First, including
a transitivity term does not affect the results of model 4, but it significantly decreases
the goodness of fit regarding model 2. Transitive triads work as a partial substitute for
the shared partner distributions GWESP and GWDSP; including the former makes the
latter insignificant and vice-versa, but a shared partner distribution with a geometric
decay parameter is better at capturing information flows. Second, as another variation
of models 2 and 4, an interest group outfactor dummy variable was added to correct for
the potential bias that may arise in the interest group homophily term if interest groups
establish more links than other actors in general. Adding this control variable does not
alter the models significantly.
List of actors involved
Code Name Type
BMA Federal Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs Government
2
Code Name Type
BML Federal Ministry for Food, Agriculture and Forestry Government
BMI Federal Ministry of the Interior Government
BMJ Federal Ministry for Youth, Family and Health Government
BMW Federal Ministry of Economics and Finance Government
BMT Federal Ministry for Research and Technology Government
BBA Federal Biological Research Centre for Agriculture and
Forestry
Government
BAM Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing Government
BAU Federal Institute for Occupational Safety and Accident Re-
search
Government
BGA Federal Health Office Government
UBA Federal Environment Agency Government
SPD Social Democratic Party of Germany Political party
CDU Christian-Democratic Union of Germany Political party
FDP Free Democratic Party Political party
AGV Consumers’ Working Group Interest group
BUND Friends of the Earth Germany Interest group
VCI German Chemical Industry Association Interest group
BBU Federal Association of Citizens’ Initiatives for Environ-
mental Protection
Interest group
IHT Association of German Chambers of Industry and Com-
merce
Interest group
VAA Association of Employed Academics and Executives in the
Chemical Industry
Interest group
IGC Chemical, Paper and Ceramic Industrial Union Interest group
BGC Professional Society of the Chemical Industry Science & Technology
DFG German Research Foundation Science & Technology
SRU German Advisory Council on the Environment Science & Technology
VDB German Company Doctors’ Association Science & Technology
GDC German Chemical Society Science & Technology
GSF German Association of Radiation Research Science & Technology
EC European Community International Organization
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development International Organization
CEF European Chemical Industry Council International Organization
Table 3: List of actors (source: Schneider and Leifeld
2009)
List of policy committees
Code Name Areas and levels Function
IPU Interadministrative Project
Group Environmental Chemicals
Administration Policy
Formulation
BLAU Intergovernmental Committee
Environmental Chemicals
Federal States
(Bundesla¨nder)
Policy
Formulation
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Code Name Areas and levels Function
AGU Working Group on Environmen-
tal Affairs
Interest Groups Policy
Formulation
DFG.ENV Working Group of the German
Research Foundation on Environ-
mental Chemicals
Science Policy
Formulation
DFG.MAK Working Group of the German
Research Foundation on Toxic
Substances at the Workplace
Science Policy
Formulation
BMA.AGA Committee on Toxic Substances
at the Workplace
Administration Policy
Formulation
BGA.AC Ad hoc Groups Chemcials Law at
the Federal Health Office
Administration Policy
Formulation
BMI.ST Working Group of the Ministry of
the Interior on Toxic Substances
in Water
Administration Policy
Formulation
BMG.BIO Project Group Environmental
Chemicals and Biocides
Administration Policy
Formulation
IMA.CHEM Interadministrative Working
Group Chemicals Law
Administration Policy
Formulation
UBA.AG Ad hoc Groups Chemcials Law at
the Federal Office for the Envi-
ronment
Administration Policy
Formulation
BMT.AC Expert Groups on Toxic Sub-
stances at the Workplace at the
Ministry of Research
Science Policy
Formulation
OECD.CP OECD Working Groups Chemi-
cals Programme
OECD Policy
Formulation
EU.WG EU Working Group Classification
of Dangerous Substances
European
Union
Policy
Formulation
EU.COR EU Expert Group 6th Amend-
ment of the Dangerous Substance
Directive
European
Union
Policy
Formulation
GDC.OS Expert Group Environmentally
Relevant Old Chemicals
Administration Policy
Implementation
BGC.AC Committee on Health Damages
by Old Chemicals
Administration Policy
Implementation
AC.NS Expert Committee New Chemi-
cals
Administration Policy
Implementation
CC.OS Coordination Committee Old
Chemicals
Administration Policy
Implementation
EU.APP Expert Groups for Implementa-
tion of the 6th Amendment Direc-
tive
European
Union
Policy
Implementation
Table 4: Institutionalized policy committees (source:
Schneider 1988: 145)
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R source code
Note: An updated replication script, which is compatible with more recent software
versions, is available in the xergm package for R. The package also contains the dataset.
# This is a script for the statistical programming environment R.
# R can be obtained from: http://www.r-project.org
# Please install the packages ‘statnet’ and ‘coda’ before proceeding!
# The .csv files can be found at: http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/17004
########## PREPARATORY STEPS ##########
# set random seed (for replication)
set.seed(12345)
# load R packages
library(statnet)
require(coda)
########## LOAD DATA ##########
# committee affiliation data
# 1 = affiliation; 0 = no affiliation
# committee names are in the row labels; actors in the column labels
comm <- read.table(file="committee.csv", header=T, row.names="label", sep=";")
# influence reputation data
# square matrix with mutual influence attribution
# 1 = influential; 0 = not influential
# cells contain the ratings of row actors about column actors
infrep <- read.table(file="infrep.csv", header=T, row.names="label", sep=";")
# political/strategic information exchange data
# directed network
pol <- read.table(file="pol.csv", header=T, row.names="label", sep=";")
# scientific sender matrix
# row actor sends scientific/technical information to column actor
scifrom <- read.table(file="scifrom.csv", header=T, row.names="label", sep=";")
# scientific receiver matrix
# row actor receives scientific/technical information from column actor
scito <- read.table(file="scito.csv", header=T, row.names="label", sep=";")
# issue positions/preferences on six key issues
# -1 = do not agree, 0 = neutral, +1 = agree
intpos <- read.table(file="intpos.csv", header=T, row.names="label", sep=";")
# type of organization
types <- read.table(file="orgtypes.csv", header=T, row.names="label", sep=";")
########## PREPARE RAW DATA FOR THE ANALYSIS ##########
# apply some changes to the data to make them network-compatible
sci <- as.matrix(scito) * t(as.matrix(scifrom)) # equation 1 in the paper
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prefsim <- dist(intpos, method="euclidean", diag=F, upper=T) # equation 2
prefsim <- max(prefsim) - prefsim # equation 3
prefsim <- as.matrix(prefsim)
committee <- crossprod(as.matrix(comm),as.matrix(comm)) # equation 4
diag(committee) <- 0 # the diagonal has no meaning
types <- as.character(types[,1]) # convert to character vector
pol <- as.matrix(pol) # convert to matrix object
infrep <- as.matrix(infrep) # convert to matrix object
# convert matrices to networks and attach attributes to them
nw.infrep <- network(infrep) # mutual influence attribution
set.vertex.attribute(nw.infrep, "orgtype", types)
nw.pol <- network(pol) # political/stratgic information exchange
set.vertex.attribute(nw.pol, "orgtype", types)
set.vertex.attribute(nw.pol, "betweenness", betweenness(nw.pol)) # centrality
nw.sci <- network(sci) # confirmed and directed technical information exchange
set.vertex.attribute(nw.sci, "orgtype", types)
set.vertex.attribute(nw.sci, "betweenness", betweenness(nw.sci)) # centrality
nw.committee <- network(committee, directed=FALSE) # no. of common committees
set.vertex.attribute(nw.committee, "orgtype", types)
set.edge.value(nw.committee, "weight", committee)
nw.intpos <- network(prefsim, directed=FALSE) # similarity in interest positions
set.vertex.attribute(nw.intpos, "orgtype", types)
set.edge.value(nw.intpos, "weight", prefsim)
########## ESTIMATION OF ERGMS ##########
# ERGM: political/strategic information exchange; only preference similarity
model1 <- ergm(nw.pol ~ edges + edgecov(nw.intpos, "weight"),
eval.loglik=TRUE, check.degeneracy=TRUE, seed=12345)
sink(file="model1.txt") # this output file contains coefficients
print(summary(model1))
print(model1$mle.lik) # also print the log likelihood
sink()
# ERGM: political/strategic information exchange; complete model
model2 <- ergm(nw.pol ~ edges + edgecov(nw.intpos, "weight") + mutual +
nodemix("orgtype", base = -7) + nodeifactor("orgtype", base = -1) +
nodeofactor("orgtype", base = -5) + edgecov(nw.committee, "weight") +
edgecov(nw.sci) + edgecov(nw.infrep) + gwesp(0.1, fixed = TRUE) +
gwdsp(0.1, fixed = TRUE), eval.loglik=TRUE, check.degeneracy=TRUE,
seed=12345)
sink(file="model2.txt") # this output file contains coefficients
print(summary(model2))
print(model2$mle.lik) # also print the log likelihood
sink()
# ERGM: technical/scientific information exchange; only preference similarity
model3 <- ergm(nw.sci ~ edges + edgecov(nw.intpos, "weight"),
eval.loglik=TRUE, check.degeneracy=TRUE, seed=12345)
sink(file="model3.txt") # this output file contains coefficients
print(summary(model3))
print(model3$mle.lik) # also print the log likelihood
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sink()
# ERGM: technical/scientific information exchange; complete model
model4 <- ergm(nw.sci ~ edges + edgecov(nw.intpos, "weight") + mutual +
nodemix("orgtype", base = -7) + nodeifactor("orgtype", base = -1) +
nodeofactor("orgtype", base = -5) + edgecov(nw.committee, "weight") +
edgecov(nw.pol) + edgecov(nw.infrep) + gwesp(0.1, fixed = TRUE) +
gwdsp(0.1, fixed = TRUE), eval.loglik=TRUE, check.degeneracy=TRUE,
seed=12345)
sink(file="model4.txt") # this output file contains coefficients
print(summary(model4))
print(model4$mle.lik) # also print the log likelihood
sink()
# ERGM: like model 2, but without the other communication (validity check)
model5 <- ergm(nw.pol ~ edges + edgecov(nw.intpos, "weight") + mutual +
nodemix("orgtype", base = -7) + nodeifactor("orgtype", base = -1) +
nodeofactor("orgtype", base = -5) + edgecov(nw.committee, "weight") +
edgecov(nw.infrep) + gwesp(0.1, fixed = TRUE) +
gwdsp(0.1, fixed = TRUE), eval.loglik=TRUE, check.degeneracy=TRUE,
seed=12345)
sink(file="model5.txt") # this output file contains coefficients
print(summary(model5))
print(model5$mle.lik) # also print the log likelihood
sink()
# ERGM: like model 2, but with betwenness centrality as covariate of alter
model6 <- ergm(nw.pol ~ edges + edgecov(nw.intpos, "weight") + mutual +
nodemix("orgtype", base = -7) + nodeifactor("orgtype", base = -1) +
nodeofactor("orgtype", base = -5) + edgecov(nw.committee, "weight") +
edgecov(nw.sci) + edgecov(nw.infrep) + gwesp(0.1, fixed = TRUE) +
gwdsp(0.1, fixed = TRUE) + nodeicov("betweenness"), eval.loglik=TRUE,
check.degeneracy=TRUE, seed=12345)
sink(file="model6.txt") # this output file contains coefficients
print(summary(model6))
print(model6$mle.lik) # also print the log likelihood
sink()
# ERGM: like model 4, but without the other communication (validity check)
model7 <- ergm(nw.sci ~ edges + edgecov(nw.intpos, "weight") + mutual +
nodemix("orgtype", base = -7) + nodeifactor("orgtype", base = -1) +
nodeofactor("orgtype", base = -5) + edgecov(nw.committee, "weight") +
edgecov(nw.infrep) + gwesp(0.1, fixed = TRUE) +
gwdsp(0.1, fixed = TRUE), eval.loglik=TRUE, check.degeneracy=TRUE,
seed=12345)
sink(file="model7.txt") # this output file contains coefficients
print(summary(model7))
print(model7$mle.lik) # also print the log likelihood
sink()
# ERGM: like model 4, but with betwenness centrality as covariate of alter
model8 <- ergm(nw.sci ~ edges + edgecov(nw.intpos, "weight") + mutual +
nodemix("orgtype", base = -7) + nodeifactor("orgtype", base = -1) +
nodeofactor("orgtype", base = -5) + edgecov(nw.committee, "weight") +
edgecov(nw.pol) + edgecov(nw.infrep) + gwesp(0.1, fixed = TRUE) +
gwdsp(0.1, fixed = TRUE) + nodeicov("betweenness"), eval.loglik=TRUE,
check.degeneracy=TRUE, seed=12345)
sink(file="model8.txt") # this output file contains coefficients
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print(summary(model8))
print(model8$mle.lik) # also print the log likelihood
sink()
########## GOODNESS-OF-FIT AND MCMC DIAGNOSTICS ##########
# goodness-of-fit assessment as shown in figure 1
gof2 <- gof(model2 ~ idegree + espartners + distance, verbose = FALSE,
burnin = 1e+5, interval = 1e+5)
gof4 <- gof(model4 ~ idegree + espartners + distance, verbose = FALSE,
burnin = 1e+5, interval = 1e+5)
pdf("gof.pdf")
par(mfrow = c(2, 3))
plot(gof2)
plot(gof4)
dev.off()
# print MCMC diagnostics to make sure the models are not degenerate
pdf("diagnostics2.pdf")
mcmc.diagnostics(model2)
dev.off()
pdf("diagnostics4.pdf")
mcmc.diagnostics(model4)
dev.off()
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